TY - JOUR AU - Acemoglu, Daron AU - Wolitzky, Alexander TI - Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 18257 PY - 2012 Y2 - July 2012 DO - 10.3386/w18257 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w18257 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w18257.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Daron Acemoglu Department of Economics, E52-446 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139 Tel: 617/253-1927 Fax: 617/253-1330 E-Mail: daron@mit.edu Alexander Wolitzky Department of Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142-1347 E-Mail: wolitzky@mit.edu AB - We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of "extremists" who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be mistakenly perceived as bad/distrusting actions. We also assume that there is limited information about the history of past actions, so that an agent is unable to ascertain exactly when and how a sequence of bad actions originated. Assuming that both sides are not extremists, spirals of distrust and conflict get started as a result of a misperception, and continue because the other side interprets the bad action as evidence that it is facing extremists. However, such spirals contain the seeds of their own dissolution: after a while, Bayesian agents correctly conclude that the probability of a spiral having started by mistake is sufficiently high, and bad actions are no longer interpreted as evidence of extremism. At this point, one party experiments with a good action, and the cycle restarts. We show how this mechanism can be useful in interpreting cycles of ethnic conflict and international war, and how it also emerges in models of political participation, dynamic inter-group trade, and communication - leading to cycles of political polarization, breakdown of trade, and breakdown of communication. ER -