The Impacts of Physician Payments on Patient Access, Use, and Health

Diane Alexander, Molly Schnell

NBER Working Paper No. 26095
Issued in July 2019, Revised in August 2020
NBER Program(s):Children, Economics of Education, Health Care, Health Economics, Public Economics

We examine how supply-side health insurance generosity affects patient access, use, and health. Exploiting large, exogenous changes in Medicaid reimbursement rates for physicians, we find that increasing payments for new patient office visits reduces reports of providers turning away beneficiaries: closing the gap in payments between Medicaid and private insurers would reduce more than two-thirds of disparities in access among adults and would eliminate such disparities entirely among children. These improvements in access lead to more office visits, better self-reported health, and reduced school absenteeism. While attention is often focused on the role of demand-side insurance generosity, such as program eligibility and patient cost-sharing, our results demonstrate that financial incentives for physicians drive access to care and have important implications for patient health.

Acknowledgments

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Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w26095